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This  paper  examines  the  issue  of  incentive-compatibility  within  environmental  stewardship 
schemes where incentive payments to farmers to provide environmental goods and services are 
based on foregone agricultural income.  The particular focus of the paper is on the role of land 
heterogeneity,  whether  in  terms  of  agricultural  value  or  environmental  value,  in  leading  to 
divergences between the actual and the socially optimal level of provision of environmental goods 
and services.  It is shown that such goods and services are systematically over or under-provided 
depending on the characteristics of land heterogeneity both within and between landscape regions.  
It is therefore concluded that incentive payments should be based on social willingness-to pay for 





The  European  Union’s  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  has  an  established  history  of 
compensating  farmers  for  policy  changes  which  have  reduced  their  production  income.    For 
example, the May 1992 CAP Reform introduced the concept of Direct Payments, which were 
designed  to  compensate  farmers  both  for  reduced  price  support  and  for  foregone  production 
income on set-aside land (see Fraser, 1993; Froud et al, 1996). 
 
More recently, agricultural policy developments in the European Union have seen farmers 
encouraged to provide environmental goods and services and, as with reforms to the CAP, where 
this provision has been at the expense of production income, then farmers have been offered 
associated compensation.  An example of this type of policy was the UK’s Countryside 
Stewardship Scheme, which has recently evolved into the Environmental Stewardship Scheme 
(Fraser and Fraser, 2005).  More specifically, DEFRA (2007a) states that the Environmental 
Stewardship Scheme “generate(s) financial incentives for farmers to provide the public goods 
they would not otherwise deliver” (p6), where these “payments are based on income foregone” 
(p13). 
 
From the policy design perspective this basis for payment to farmers raises the question of 
whether it corrects the market failure in relation to the provision of environmental goods and 
services, and in so doing delivers “the socially optimal level of those goods and services” (p6). 
 
In this context Rygnestad and Fraser (1996) demonstrated a relevant problem of incentive 
compatibility in policy design as it related to the operation of the CAP’s set-aside policy in 
situations of heterogeneous land quality.  In particular, with set-aside premiums established with 
reference to average levels of production income foregone, in the presence of heterogeneous land 
quality it was shown that it was in farmers’ best interests to set-aside the lowest quality land in 
terms of production income, this resulting in policy “slippage” with respect to output control.  
 
The aim of this paper is to show that a similar problem of incentive compatibility in relation to 
policy design besets environmental schemes, such as the UK’s Environmental Stewardship 
Scheme, where payments to farmers for providing environmental goods and services are based on 
average levels of agricultural income foregone, rather than on society’s willingness-to-pay for 
these environmental goods and services.  In particular it will be shown that with incentive 
payments for such environmental schemes based on average foregone production income, the 
presence of land heterogeneity, both in terms of agricultural value and in terms of environmental 





The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 1 examines the problem of “local” land 
heterogeneity, demonstrating how a uniform incentive payment system based on average 
production income foregone within a region of similar environmental value and agricultural land 
use results in actual levels of provision of environmental goods and services which are both 
extremely sensitive to the levels of these payments, and systematically encouraging under or over-
provision of environmental goods and services between farms relative to the socially optimal 
levels within the region.  Section 2 then examines the problem of land heterogeneity between 
regions, where this heterogeneity can be in relation either to the level of agricultural income or to 
the size of environmental benefits.  Once again it is shown that, with incentive payments based on 
agricultural income foregone, such payments will systematically misallocate taxpayer funding 
between regions.  In particular: 
 
(i)  there will be excess provision of environmental goods and services in regions of 
  relatively high agricultural income and/or low environmental benefits from such goods 
  and services: 
 
(ii)  there will be inadequate provision of environmental goods and services in regions of 
  relatively low agricultural income and/or high environmental benefits from such goods 
  and services. 
 
Moreover, such misallocation may be so extreme that the overall level of social benefit is less 
than the cost of taxpayer funding, thereby resulting in not just a re-distribution of income, but also 
a dead weight loss to society from the policy’s operation.  The paper ends with a brief Conclusion 
in which it is suggested that the payments to farmers for the provision of environmental goods and 






2. Section 1:  Local Land Heterogeneity 
This section examines the problem for policy design of “local” land heterogeneity.  By 
“local” is meant a region of farms with a landscape of similar environmental value and 
similar agricultural land use.  From the policy perspective “local” is also used to indicate 
a region where the established payments for providing the same environmental goods and 
services are uniform across the region. 
 
By land heterogeneity in this context is meant variation both within and between farms in 
terms of the agricultural productivity of land.  For example, in the study of Danish cereal 
farms by Rygnestad and Fraser (1996), croppable land was broadly characterised as being 
either poor, average or good, with the maximum yields varying in each case from 5.45 to 
8.45 to 10.45 tonnes/ha.  Moreover, each farm was characterised by the proportion of 
each of these land types which it comprised.  As a consequence, each farmer would 
respond to the introduction of compulsory set-aside by setting-aside their lowest quality 
land.  But  farms with an overall higher quality of land would  experience the largest 
decreases in production income. 
 
Given such land heterogeneity on-farm, when a farmer is considering the marginal cost 
per  hectare  of  converting  land  from  agricultural  production  to  the  provision  of 
environmental goods and services, then this marginal cost will be an increasing function 
of the agricultural productivity of each hectare of land.  This marginal cost is represented 
in Figure 1 (for continuous variation across the farm in agricultural productivity) by the 
line MC
o
E.  In this situation if the established incentive payment per hectare in the region 
for converting land from agricultural production to the provision of environmental goods 
and services is given by OCo, then the farmer will choose to convert the Qo hectares of 
their  land  for  which  the  agricultural  income  foregone  is  less  than  (or  equal  to)  this 
incentive payment.  Moreover if the farm in question is made up of land which is of 
relatively poor quality compared with the average for that region, and with incentive 
payments per hectare based on average levels of agricultural income foregone for the 
region as a whole, then this farmer may instead find that the incentive payment is such as 
given by OC1, in which case the farmer will choose to convert the larger area Q1 of the 
farm to providing environmental goods and services.  In this context, note that if the farm 
in question is comprised of land which is less heterogeneous in quality, such that the 




represented by the flatter line MC
1
E in Figure 2.  Moreover, in this case it can be seen that 
the farmer’s chosen area of converted land is more sensitive to the established level of the 
incentive payment (i.e OCo or OC1) with this area varying from Qo to Q2 in the case of 
MC
1




Consider next the situation where the farmer’s choice of converted area with respect to 
the incentive payment is compared with the socially optimal  converted area.   In this 
situation  the  socially  optimal  converted  area  is  found  by  referring  to  the  social 
(willingness-to-pay) demand curve for environmental goods and services on the farmer’s 
land in this region.  This demand curve is represented by the line DS in Figure 3.  Also 
represented in Figure 3 is the marginal cost curve for converting land (MC
o
E), and the 
established incentive payment for converting land (OCo).  It can be seen that the situation 
represented in Figure 3 has been designed to create an outcome where the farmer’s actual 
choice of area to convert (QA) is exactly equal to the socially optimal area to convert (QS) 
– i.e. where the social willingness-to-pay for conversion is exactly equal to the farmer’s 
marginal cost of conversion. 
 
However,  now  consider  a  situation  of  two  farms  in  the  same  region,  so  that  the 
established incentive payments and the social willingness-to-pay for converted land are 
the  same  for  both  farms,  but  where  these  two  farms  exhibit  between-farm  land 
heterogeneity in terms of the average agricultural productivity of their land.  In particular 
consider farm X, which has an average agricultural productivity of land which exceeds 
the average for the region as a whole, and farm Y, which has an average agricultural 
productivity  of  land  which  is  below  the  average  for  the  region  as  a  whole.    As  a 
consequence, the established incentive payment per hectare for the region is below the 
marginal cost of conversion per hectare for most of farm X, and above this marginal cost 
for most of farm Y.  This situation is represented in Figure 4, where both the incentive 
payment per hectare of converted land and the social demand curve for each hectare of 
converted land are unchanged from those in Figure 3 (i.e. OCo and Ds), but the above-





E respectively.  It can be seen from figure 4 that this between-farm form of land 
heterogeneity results in very divergent levels of actual converted land being chosen by the 
two farmers (i.e. Q
X
A compared with Q
Y
A).  In addition, even though the social demand 




conversion justifies a different socially optimal area of converted on each farm, with this 




S) to reflect farm Y’s lower 
marginal cost of conversion.  But more importantly, a comparison of the actual with the 
socially optimal areas of conversion for each farm shows that the uniform conversion 
incentive payments per hectare across the region combined with the between-farm land 
heterogeneity  within  the  region  results  in  a  systematic  under  or  over-provision  of 
environmental goods and services by farmers relative to the social optimum for their 
farm.    Specifically,  for  farms  in  the  region  which  have  above-average  quality  of 
agricultural land for the region (such as X), farmers will systematically choose to convert 
less that the socially optimal area of converted land for their farms.  While for farmers in 
the region which have below-average quality of agricultural land for the region (such as 
Y), farmers will systematically choose to convert more than the socially optimal area of 
converted land for their farms.  Therefore, even though the environmental value of land is 
similar  across  the  region,  the  uniform  incentive  payments  system  combined  with  the 
between-farm land heterogeneity means that the provision of environmental goods and 
services will be concentrated in parts of the region where the agricultural value of land is 
below-average.  Moreover, note that this intra-regional misallocation of funds will occur 
even when the total funding to the region for the provision of environmental goods and 





                                                            
1 Note also that if instead environmental value was much higher than given by DS, then at some level both 
types of farms would feature inadequate provision.  Similarly, for environmental value much lower than DS, 
at some level both types of farms would feature excess provision.  Even so, the provision of environmental 





Section 2:  Land Heterogeneity Between Regions 
 
This section considers the policy design problem where regions are subject to the same 
environmental stewardship scheme, but feature land heterogeneity in terms of agricultural 
productivity and/or environmental value.  The following analysis is based largely on 
comparing two regions which are specified as featuring only one of these aspects of land 
heterogeneity, although the situation where two regions differ in terms of both 
agricultural productivity and environmental value is considered later in this section.  Note 
that in all cases farmers continue to be specified as facing on-farm land heterogeneity in 
terms of an increasing marginal cost of converting land from agricultural production to 
the provision of environmental goods and services.  However, to simplify the intra-region 
specification all farms in the same region are assumed to be identical, so that the analysis 
for each region is based on a “representative” farm. 
 
2.1 Heterogeneity in Environmental Value 
 
In this case the two regions are specified to be equivalent in terms of agricultural productivity, 
such that the incentive payment per hectare for converting land to the provision of environmental 
goods and services is identical for the two regions.  However, the two regions are heterogeneous 
in terms of the social value of their environmental landscape, with one region featuring greater 
social willingness-to-pay for environmental goods and services per hectare than the other.  An 
example of this type of situation would be two regions with similar agricultural income per 
hectare, but where one region was closer to a large population centre than the other, so that the 
total demand for environmental goods and services was greater in the former region.  This 
situation is represented in Figure 5.  Figure 5 shows that the actual proportion of land chosen to be 
converted to the provision of environmental goods and services is the same for both regions (QA), 
consistent with their identical agricultural productivity and incentive payments to convert land.  
However, it can also be seen that the environmental land heterogeneity between the two regions 
results in a systematic misallocation of the provision of environmental goods and services 
between the two regions.  In particular, for the region of relatively high environmental value (as 
represented by D
S
2 the actual amount of converted land is less than the socially optimal amount 
(Q
S
2).  While for the region of relatively low environmental value (as represented by D
S
1), the 
actual amount of converted land exceeds the socially optimal amount (Q
S
1).  Therefore, it can be 
seen that the operation of a uniform incentive payments scheme across these two regions, which is 
justified in terms of the requirement for such payments to be “based on income foregone”, results 








2.2  Heterogeneity in Agricultural Value 
 
In this case the two regions are specified to be equivalent in terms of environmental value, such 
that the social willingness-to-pay per hectare for environmental goods and services is the same for 
both regions.  However, the two regions are heterogeneous in terms of their agricultural 
productivity, such that with the agricultural income foregone from conversion higher in one 
region than the other, the two regions also differ in the levels of their scheme-based incentive 
payments for conversion.  An example of this type of situation in the UK would be an arable 
region and a hill-farming region, where the agricultural income per hectare is higher in the arable 
region than in the hill-farming region, but where the total environmental value of the two regions 
is similar, perhaps because the hill-farming region features higher environmental value per 
individual user, but is more distant from a population centre than the arable region.  This situation 
is represented in Figure 6, where the difference in incentive payments between the two regions 
(OC1 and OC2) has been specified to result in the same area of land actually converted in each 
region (QA).   By contrast, in considering the social benefit and cost of providing environmental 
goods and services in the two regions, it can be seen that the socially optimal amount of converted 





1).  Moreover, as specified in Figure 6, this situation also features excess provision of 
environmental goods and services in the region of high agricultural value, and inadequate 
provision of environmental goods and services in the region of low agricultural value.
3  
Consequently, it can be seen that the operation of the incentive payments scheme, by 
differentiating the two regions on the grounds of agricultural income foregone, when in terms of 
environmental value they are identical, results once again in a systematic misallocation of the 
provision of environmental goods and services between the two regions, with a particular bias 
towards excess provision in the region of high agricultural value, and inadequate provision in the 
region of low agricultural value. 
                                                            
2 Note as in the previous section that for extremely divergent levels of incentive payments and social 
willingness-to-pay environmental goods and services could be under or over-provided in both regions.  
However, the extent of under or over-provision would still differ markedly between the two regions, and a 
bias remain towards under-provision in the region of higher environmental value, and over-provision in the 
region of lower environmental value. 
3 Note as previously that if instead environmental value was much higher than given by D
S then at some 
level both regions would feature inadequate provision.  Similarly, for environmental value much lower than 
D
S  at some level both regions would feature excess provision.  But in both cases the relative bias in 




2.3  Heterogeneity in both Agricultural and Environmental Value 
This sub-section considers the case where the two regions differ in terms of both agricultural and 
environmental value.  It should be recognised at the outset that if these differences took the form 
of the region of higher agricultural value also being the region of higher environmental value, 
then agricultural income foregone could in effect be seen as a “proxy” for social willingness-to-
pay for environmental goods and services.  It follows that in this case designing incentive 
payments for conversion based on agricultural income foregone would to some extent substitute 
for social values and potentially yield socially desirable outcomes in terms of the level and 
distribution of the provision of environmental goods and services. 
 
However, such a positive correlation between agricultural and environmental value seems at odds 
with both the research evidence and casual observation.  For example, Fraser and Rygnestad 
(1999) showed for Danish cereal growing that croppable land with relatively low agricultural 
productivity was also the land that offered the highest potential benefits from set-aside in terms of 
reduced nitrate leaching.  Moreover, in the UK (and other EU countries), the so-called “Less 
Favoured Areas” in terms of agricultural income per hectare, are also increasingly being referred 
to as areas of “High Nature Value”.  (EEA, 2004).  As a consequence, the following numerical 
illustration is based on specifying a negative correlation between agricultural and environmental 
value, so that the region of low agricultural value also features high environmental value, and vice 
versa for the other region. 
 
Note that the purpose of this numerical illustration is not just to quantify the misallocation of the 
provision of environmental goods and services between the two regions as was done qualitatively 
in the previous two sub-sections.  Rather, the additional benefit of this approach is that it allows 
quantification  of both total government spending and total consumer surplus generated by such 
spending on the operation of an incentive payment system for the conversion of agricultural land 
to the provision of environmental goods and services: 
 
To proceed based on the framework of the previous sub-sections, let the low agricultural/high 
environmental value region have the following specification (where this region is denoted by 
“H”): 
 
  DH  =  120 – q 
 
  MCH  =  15 + 0.5q 
 





While for the high agricultural/low environmental value region (denoted by “L”): 
 
  DL  =  60 – q 
 
  MCL  =  30  + 0.5q 
 
  OCL  =  70 
 
On this basis Table 1 contains details of the results of the numerical illustration.  As expected 
from the findings of 2.1 and 2.2, and given the specified negative correlation between agricultural 
and environmental value, there is excess provision of environmental goods and services in Region 
L, and inadequate provision in Region H.  Moreover, given the chosen parameter values, there is 
greater actual governmental spending than is socially optimal, and actual consumer surplus is less 
than that achieved with the socially optimal provision of environmental goods and services.  But 
the most significant quantitative finding is that while consumer surplus exceeds governmental 
spending in the case of the socially optimal provision (a ratio of 1.62:1) the actual provision leads 
to a deadweight welfare loss with total governmental spending exceeding the gains in consumer 
surplus (a ratio of 0.76:1).  It follows that in this case the operation of the incentive payments 
scheme based on agricultural income foregone results not just in a redistribution of income 






The aim of this paper has been to assess the problems of incentive compatibility for 
environmental stewardship schemes which feature incentive payments to farmers to provide 
environmental goods and services based on agricultural income foregone.  The particular focus of 
the paper has been on the role of land heterogeneity, in terms of both agricultural and 
environmental value, as a cause of design problems for such environmental policies. 
 
Section 1 considered the problem of “local” land heterogeneity, whereby a farmer’s participation 
in an environmental stewardship scheme is influenced by heterogeneous agricultural productivity 
of land on their own farm, and where farms in the same region may differ in terms of their 
average agricultural productivity.  Section 2 considered the problem of land heterogeneity 
between regions, where these regions may differ in terms of agricultural or environmental value, 
or both.   
 
In Sections 1 and 2 it has shown that the operation of an incentive payment system for farmers to 
convert land based on agricultural income foregone leads to a misallocation of the provision of 
environmental goods and services, both within and between regions.  In particular in Section 1 it 
was shown that such a system will encourage the over-provision of environmental goods and 
services (relative to the socially optimal level) on farms within a region that feature relatively low 
average quality of agricultural land.  In addition, in Section 2 it was shown that such a system will 
encourage: 
 
i)  the over-provision of environmental goods and services (relative to the socially optimal 
level) in regions of relatively high agricultural income and/or low environmental benefits 
from such goods and services and 
 
ii)  the under-provision of environmental goods and services (relative to the socially optimal 
level) in regions of relatively low agricultural income and/or high environmental benefits 
from such goods and services. 
 
Moreover, in a situation where the regions involved feature a negative correlation between 
agricultural and environmental value, it was shown that the misallocation of funding for the  
provision of environmental goods and services between regions may be so great as to result in an  
overall reduction in social welfare from the operation of the scheme. 
 




environmental goods and services should be based on the associated social benefit from the 
provision of such goods and services rather than on the associated agricultural income foregone.  
In this context it is interesting to note that although the UK’s Environmental Stewardship Scheme 
states that it uses agricultural income foregone as the basis for determining incentive payments for 
the provision of environmental goods and services, that Scheme does actually contain an 
exception to this “rule”.  Specifically, within the component of this Scheme called “Higher Level 
Stewardship” one of the identified environmental services is “Educational Access”, which 
provides “schools and colleges” with the opportunity to visit farms and have farmers “explain the 
links between farming, conservation and food production” (DEFRA, 2007b, p94).  In this case the 
incentive payments to farmers is “per visit”, and in applying to participate in the provision of 
“Educational Access” farmers are “expected to provide evidence of this demand” (DEFRA, 
2007b, p94).  Consequently, in making their decision regarding whether to provide this 
environmental service farmers must take account of the social benefit associated with its provision 
in so far as this will determine the “demand” for “Educational Access”.  Therefore, with this 
precedent for incentive payments based on social benefit already established within the UK’s 
Environmental Stewardship Scheme, the prospects must be brighter for the broader 
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Different Extents of Land  Heterogeneity 
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Two Regions with Different Agricultural Value 

















































Area Converted  Region L  Region H  Total 
i)  Actual  80  30  110 
ii)  Optimal  20  70  90 
       
Governmental Spending       
i)  Actual  5600  900  6500 
ii)  Optimal  800  3500  4300 
       
Consumer Surplus       
i)  Actual  1800  3150  4950 
ii)  Optimal  1000  5950  6950 
 
 